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Enhanced Monitoring of White Collar
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Jeff Kray* and Pamela Robertson**
Technology enhances employers' ability to monitor the at-
work activities of white collar employees.' As a consequence,
employers increasingly utilize electronic devices to monitor tel-
ephone conversations, customer service operations, video dis-
play terminal (VDT) use, and other workplace activities in an
attempt to objectively measure employee productivity, to pace
work, and to combat crime.2 This Comment examines the
legal and economic effects of employers' enhanced monitoring
of white collar employees and encourages the enactment of
federal legislation requiring employers to disclose the use of
enhanced monitoring to their employees.
In the typical white collar employment relationship, the
employee is paid a wage or salary in exchange for services ren-
dered. Compensation for roughly eighty-six percent of all
employees is measured in units of time rather than output.3
Although the employer can easily measure an employee's
hours, the employer may find that measuring whether or not
the employee is using that time efficiently is a far more diffi-
cult task. Consequently, because monitoring equipment is
readily available to monitor employee efficiency, employers
now use electronic monitoring to evaluate the performance of
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1. The term "enhanced monitoring" is used in this Comment to describe post-
hiring monitoring of employees. Drug testing, honesty tests, polygraphs, and other
employee screening techniques are not addressed in this Comment.
2. See generally Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process In Private
Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1977); New Means of Workplace
Surveillance Seen Posing Legal Risks For Employers, 193 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-13
(Oct. 6, 1989).
3. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PuBLIc POUCY 2 (3rd ed. 1987).
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four to six million employees.4
The effect of enhanced monitoring on the employment
relationship depends upon the manner in which the employer
implements the monitoring and the aversion to being moni-
tored by the individual employee. Because the employment
relationship exists for the economic benefit of both the
employer and the employee, legal and economic considerations
are significant in the employer's decision to monitor as well as
the employee's decision to remain in a monitored environment.
This Comment presents a five part legal and economic analysis
of enhanced monitoring of white collar employees. Section I
defines the employment contract. Section II provides an over-
view of the legal issues raised by enhanced monitoring of white
collar employees. Section III discusses the economics of
enhanced monitoring. Section IV presents an analysis of the
legal and economic effects of an employer's enhanced monitor-
ing of white collar employees. Finally, Section V describes and
evaluates proposed federal legislation that would require
employers to disclose the use of enhanced monitoring to
employees.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT-EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
Roughly sixty-five percent of all American employees are
hired on an at will basis.5 Employees with employment con-
tracts specifying the duration and terms of employment, union
members employed under collective bargaining agreements,
and civil servants comprise the remainder of the American
labor pool. The unique economic and legal complexities
presented by employment relationships involving union and
civil service employees are not within the scope of this Com-
ment.' As a result, this Comment will not address collective
4. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace, NEW YORK L.J., July 6, 1990, at 3, 32 n.1 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW
TENSIONS 28 (1987)).
5. Of the remainder, roughly 22% are union employees, and roughly 15% are
federal or state government employees. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 299, 382, 419 (1990)
(indicating number of government employees in 1987, total labor force in 1988, and
union membership in 1988). See generally Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1816 (1980) [hereinafter Protecting At Will Employees].
6. See generally Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1837 n.109.
Unionization has typically been unsuccessful among white collar, service sector, and
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bargaining and civil service employment relationships.
Instead, this Comment will focus solely on enhanced monitor-
ing of white collar employees hired on either an at will basis or
under an individual employment contract specifying the terms
and duration of employment.
The employment contract can be either written or oral.
Breach of a contract specifying the terms and duration of
employment provides the employee with a contract action
against the employer for lost wages, fringe benefits, reliance
damages, and compensatory damages.7 In the employment
context, however, contracts specifying the terms and duration
of employment are uncommon (roughly three percent or less
of the total workforce).' The parties typically do not define all
the terms of employment because high transaction costs, high
information costs, and unequal bargaining power discourage
complete negotiations and specified terms.9 As a result, the
scope of the employer's right to monitor is usually not defined
by the parties.
Rather than define specific terms of employment and
duration, the parties define only such basic terms of employ-
ment as wages, hours, and benefits. Under the doctrine of
employment at will, an employment contract indefinite as to
duration is terminable at will by either the employer or the
employee.' ° In effect, employment at will is a series of unilat-
eral contracts. The contract is formed when the employer uni-
laterally offers wage or salary compensation, and the employee
accepts by either beginning or continuing to perform the job
professional occupations. At the same time, these jobs are the fastest growing
category. I&
7. Michael H. Whitehill, Damages in Employment Contract Cases, 24 TRIAL MAG.
25 (July 1988).
8. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1830, 1837 n.2.
9. CHARLES G. BAKALY & JOEL M. GROSSMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS § 3.3 (2d ed. 1989); Protecting At Will Employees, supra
note 5, at 1831 ("[E]mployees may tend to discount substantially the risk of wrongful
discharge, and as a result systematically undervalue job security.... In addition, most
employees have only limited access to information about personnel relations in a firm
and are unable to 'shop around' by comparing the firm's relative turnover rate and
firing histories. Companies further contribute to the employee's predicament by
promoting an image of job security that is not completely accurate." (footnotes
omitted)).
10. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977);
see Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 345 U.S. 941
(1953); see also Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); see
generally Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1816.
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offered."' In employment at will, despite the employee's
expectations about the duration and nature of employment,
the employee may be without a contract remedy when the
employer alters the terms of the employment relationship.
The employer's alteration of the terms of employment is sim-
ply an offer to the employee to accept a new unilateral
employment contract. The employee may accept the contract
and the new terms by continuing employment or reject the
contract by resigning.
In the case of enhanced monitoring, strict application of
the employment at will doctrine means that if the current
employment contract does not limit the employer's right to
utilize enhanced monitoring, then an employee has no basis for
a breach of contract action when the employer implements
such monitoring. Given that the white collar employment
relationship is predominantly at will, are any legal restrictions
placed on the employer's ability to utilize enhanced
monitoring?
II. THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF ENHANCED MONITORING
Some type of employer monitoring of employees occurs in
almost every employment relationship. Until recently, most
white collar monitoring took the subjective form of random
visual observation by the office supervisor. Historically, the
supervisor observes the employees at work, and the employees
are aware that they are being observed. In this context, courts
have generally recognized that "the employer may exercise
reasonable managerial rights of supervision even though this
may not be specifically set forth in the parties' agreement."'
12
Courts have upheld the employer's right to monitor employees
for efficiency purposes, theft prevention, and compliance with
employment regulations.'3
As technology extended the employer's ability to monitor
11. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1818.
12. Craver, supra note 2, at 50; Thomas v. General Electric Co., 207 F. Supp. 792,
799 (W.D. Ky. 1962); see Picker X-Ray Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1246 (1963); see
also F & M Schaeffer Brewing Co., 40 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 199, 200 (1963).
13. See Thomas, 207 F. Supp. at 792; Picker X-ray Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
at 1246 (monitoring for efficiency purposes not a violation of employment contract);
U.S. Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1967) (monitoring for theft prevention
permissible and "surreptitious nature of some techniques does not diminish their
propriety"); FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 335 (1966) (management properly
concerned with employee theft and efficiency).
[Vol. 15:131
Disclosure of Enhanced Monitoring
employee activities beyond mere supervision by a visibly pres-
ent manager, the courts extended the employer's right to mon-
itor. For example, still photographs, motion picture
recordings, and closed circuit television monitoring of employ-
ees have been upheld as nothing more than an alternate
method of supervision.14 In Thomas v. General Electric Co., 5
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky ruled against an employee who sought nominal dam-
ages and injunctive relief prohibiting General Electric from
utilizing pictures of plant operations in which the employee
appeared.16 Because the still photographs were taken solely to
increase operating efficiency and to promote safety, the court
dismissed the complaint.' 7
The employer's right to monitor is not without limits,
however. When courts analyze employee monitoring, the pro-
priety of monitoring depends on such factors as the nature of
the monitoring, the employee's awareness of the monitoring,
the classification of the monitored activity as business or pri-
vate, and the egregiousness of the monitoring.'8 Constitutional
issues are usually not a factor because Constitutional protec-
tion of employee privacy rights does not extend to private,
non-governmental conduct.' 9 Because Constitutional protec-
tions are limited and because statutory regulation of monitor-
ing is currently limited to wiretap laws, employee challenges to
employer monitoring are generally presented as contract or
tort actions. Following a brief discussion of the wiretap laws,
this Section will provide an overview of the legal aspects of
enhanced monitoring, emphasizing the contract and tort
actions available to an employee who believes that an
employer is improperly utilizing enhanced monitoring.
A. Partial Statutory Protection-Wiretap Laws
Under the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Act), it is a crime to "intentionally inter-
14. Thomas, 207 F. Supp. at 799; FMC Cor., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 336; see
also De Lury v. Kretchmer, 66 Misc. 2d 897, 899, 322 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
15. 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
16. Id. at 799.
17. Id.
18. See Watkins v. L.M. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983); see also James v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cr. 1979).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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cept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication."'  In
1986, Congress extended the Act to private communication sys-
tems that affect interstate commerce. In addition, "electronic
communication" was added to the activities protected by the
Act, and the definition of "wire communication" was broad-
ened to include digitized voice transmissions and voice trans-
missions by radio and fiber optic cable.'
Although electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and
video teleconferences are now protected under the Act, the
protection is limited to the content of the communications.'
Thus, monitoring the existence of communications is not pro-
hibited. Furthermore, broad exceptions for extension tele-
phones and "providers of communications services" were
retained in the 1986 amendment. 23
Under the extension telephone exception, an employer
can, "in the ordinary course of business," use an extension tele-
phone to monitor employee calls.' In James v. Newspaper
Agency Corp.,' telephone monitoring devices were considered
within the ordinary course of business when employees were
notified of their use and when the devices were used to protect
employees from abusive calls and to instruct them on dealing
with the public. In Watkins v. L.M Berry Co.,26 however, a
supervisor's use of an extension phone to intercept employee's
personal calls was not within the ordinary course of business.
The Watkins court found that the employer had previously
authorized personal calls and told employees that personal
calls would only be monitored to the extent necessary to deter-
mine whether they were personal.' In such a case, the court
held that monitoring of personal calls violated the Act.
28
Under the communication services exception, phone com-
panies and other providers of wire communication services are
allowed to monitor employees to determine the quality of serv-
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (1989).
21. IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD & ROBERT L. DUSTON, WORKPLACE PRIVACY 65 (BNA
Special Report) (1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (4), (5)(a), and (12) (1986)).
22. SHEPARD & DUSTON, supra note 21, at 65.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (4), (5)(a), and (12) (1989).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1989); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Protecting Private
Employees From Enhanced Monitoring: Legislative Approaches, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59,
77 (1990).
25. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
26. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
27. Id. at 582.
28. Id. at 583.
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ices being provided.29 In Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,' monitoring of a Southwestern Bell employee's
personal calls was permissible when the employee placed the
calls on customer-trouble report lines and the employee was
previously warned not to use those lines for personal calls.
31
The court found that keeping the lines free for customers was
a sufficient enough business interest to allow the employer to
monitor the calls.
In summary, the broad exceptions to the Wiretap Act limit
its applicability to the usual forms of enhanced monitoring that
check an employee's speed, efficiency, or presence.3 The limi-
tations of the Act are clearly demonstrated by the Supreme
Court's holding that an employer's use of a pen register, a
device used to record telephone numbers dialed, is not prohib-
ited by the Act.' Until new legislation is passed, employees
must look beyond statutory protection for relief from an
employer's improper use of enhanced monitoring.
B. Contracts
Under traditional contract law, if the employer's right to
utilize enhanced monitoring is not restricted in the contract,
the doctrine of employment at will provides little protection
for an employee's expectations that such monitoring will not
occur. 4 As already discussed, under the unilateral contract
interpretation of employment at will, despite the employee's
job expectations, the introduction of enhanced monitoring into
the employment relationship effectively provides the employee
with only two options: acceptance of the monitoring as a term
of the unilateral contract or resignation of the position. How-
ever, in order to account for employee job expectations, many
courts now recognize three general exceptions to employment
at will: (1) public policy, (2) implied-in-fact promise, and (3)
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 5 These
29. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 77.
30. 452 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Okla. 1978), qff'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. Id. at 396.
32. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 79-80.
33. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
34. Note that the principle of equity allows the employee to rescind an oral or
written employment contract entered into in reliance upon a misrepresentation by the
employer that monitoring would not occur. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 152 (1981).
35. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
In Wagenseller, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized a trend toward modifying the
1371991]
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exceptions represent a recognition that employment at will
"often leaves many contingencies unsettled either because it is
too costly to negotiate every term or because parties lack ade-
quate information about risks."'
The first exception, public policy, permits an employee to
recover in tort for wrongful discharge when the court finds
that the employer's conduct undermined a clearly mandated
public policy. ' The tort of wrongful discharge will be dis-
cussed in the following section of this Comment.
The second exception permits an employee to recover on
the basis of an implied-in-fact contract term. An implied-in-
fact contract term is one that is inferred from the statements
or conduct of the parties.s8 These terms may be inferred from
employee handbooks, personnel policies, and oral or written
representations regarding job security, benefits, and business
usage and custom.' In a case involving an employee hand-
book, the Idaho Supreme Court recently stated that
unless an employee handbook specifically negates any inten-
tion on the part of the employer to have it become part of
the employment contract, a court may conclude from a
review of the employee handbook that a question of fact is
created regarding whether the handbook was intended by
at will rule, appling both the public policy and the implied-in-fact promise exceptions
to a hospital employee's suit for wrongful discharge and breach of contract. The court
also recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
at will contract but rejected application of the covenant in situations where it would
create a duty for the employer to terminate the employee only for just cause. Id See
also Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), modified in
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (stating that every
employment contract has an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that limits the employer's discretion to terminate an at will employee); Fortune v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (adopting public policy and implied-
in-fact promise but refusing to adopt implied-in-law covenant); Seubert v. McKesson
Corp., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1514, 1520, 281 Cal. Rptr. 857, 861 (1990) ("While there is a
presumption that employment is terminable at will, that presumption may be
superseded by contract, express or implied, which limits the employer's right to
discharge the employee."). See Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1830-33.
36. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1832.
37. Joseph DeGiusseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule On
Employee Rights To Job Security And Fringe Benefits, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 30-34
(1981).
38. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 381, 710 P.2d at 1036; see Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, reh'g denied, 409 Mich. 1101 (1980); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
39. Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A
Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 17 (1984).
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the parties to impliedly express a term of the employment
agreement.40
The Michigan Supreme Court also recently applied the
implied-in-fact exception and found that an employer was con-
tractually precluded from discharging employees without cause
when the employer made policy statements that employees
would be dismissed for just cause.4 ' If the employer has
announced an employment policy, the courts have treated that
policy as binding.'
The Eleventh Circuit has held that it was illegal for an
employer to authorize employees to make personal calls and to
then subsequently monitor those calls when made.43  Such a
holding demonstrates the potential for a court to find implied-
in-fact contract terms where an employer's representations
imply that enhanced monitoring will not occur. By analogy, an
employer risks an action for breach of an implied-in-fact con-
tract if the employer implies by action, representation, or pol-
icy that employee evaluations will be based on the employer's
subjective observations and then subsequently, the employer
bases employee evaluations on objective data gathered through
enhanced monitoring.44
40. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989); accord
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
41. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 611, 292 N.W. 2d at 890; see also Eales v. Tanana Valley
Medical-Surgical Groups Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In the State of Washington, the
implied-in-fact exception is narrower. An enforceable contract is only created when
an employer "creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises
of specific treatment in specific situations." Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984); accord Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence,
112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989); Seikawitch v. Washington Beef Producers, 58
Wash. App. 454, 793 P.2d 994 (1990). Furthermore, where a personnel policy manual is
merely a guideline to management and is not disseminated to employees, the employer
is not contractually obligated to abide by the policies unless the manual contains
statements that constitute a promise of specific treatment in a specific situation and
the statements were justifiably relied upon by the employee. Stewart v. Chevron
Chemical Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (1988).
42. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088 (providing that once an
employer announces a specific policy or practice, especially in light of the fact that the
employer expects employees to abide by the same, the employer may not treat its
promises as illusory); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 381, 710
P.2d 1025, 1036 (1985).
43. Watkins v. LM. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983).
44. Although the theory of implied-in-fact promise is distinguishable from the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, the courts frequently apply them interchangeably.
Promissory estoppel operates to bind express promises. "A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
140 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 15:131
The third exception permits both contract and tort recov-
ery for breach of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.45 This covenant requires that neither party impair
the right of the other party to receive the benefit of the bar-
gain.' Decisions in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.47
and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.' extended this implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing to employment at will con-
tracts.49  Following the decisions in Fortune and Monge, courts
have recognized both tort and contract actions for bad faith by
an employer.' The scope of this covenant is uncertain, how-
ever. Not all states recognize the implied-in-law covenant, and
the modern trend in those states that do recognize the cove-
nant is to drastically narrow its scope.51
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcT § 90 (1981). Interestingly, while implied-in-fact promise is now an
exception to the doctrine of employment at will in over half the states, courts have
regularly refused to extend the doctrine of promissory estoppel to employment at will.
DeGiusseppe, supra note 37, at 44. There are, however, cases in which promissory
estoppel has been applied to employment at will. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (applying doctrine of promissory estoppel when an
employer offered employment and an employee resigned prior employment and
declined other offers in reliance on the offer); see also Bowers v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that under Missouri law employees can
recover damages based on reasonable detrimental reliance on an employer's detailed
promises of employment).
45. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 381, 710 P.2d at 1036; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
46. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 383, 710 P.2d at 1038.
47. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
48. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
49. Fortune, 373 Mass. at 106, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (providing that salesman
employed under a written terminable at will contract could recover for breach of
implied covenant of good faith when the employer's purpose in terminating the
employee was to avoid paying the employee commission on a five million dollar sale);
Monge, 114 N.H. at 130, 316 A.2d at 549 (allowing employee hired for indefinite
duration and fired after resisting the sexual advances of foreman to recover contract
damages for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); accord
Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977) (providing that an
employee by reason of the bad faith of his employer has a right of action for breach of
contract notwithstanding the fact that he was an employee at will).
50. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 638 P.2d 1063 (1983) (recognizing
a bad faith tort cause of action that was eliminated by The Montana Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN, §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991));
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989) (recognizing bad
faith contract cause of action).
51. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 109 Wash. 2d 747, 748 P.2d 621 (1988) (stating
that an at will employment contract does not contain an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing or a bad faith exception); accord Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
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Both the California and Idaho Supreme Courts have
recently held that "a breach of the covenant is a breach of the
employment contract and is not a tort."' Although limiting
the covenant to actions in contract, California and Idaho have
also rejected the bad faith standard as unworkable.' These
courts have adopted the rule that "any action which violates,
nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit of the employ-
ment contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant. ' 54
Enhanced monitoring modifies existing employment condi-
tions.5 For that reason, in those jurisdictions that recognize
the covenant, a "general contract provision requiring manage-
ment to preserve all working provisions beneficial to the
employees might preclude implementation."' Thus, under the
covenant, enhanced monitoring may be an actionable breach of
the employment contract when the monitoring modifies
employment conditions and deprives the employee of the bene-
fit of the bargain. 7
In employment at will, only when the employer's utiliza-
tion of enhanced monitoring is against a legally or factually
implied term of the employment contract can the employee
allege that the monitoring breaches the employment contract.
Thus, contract damages are only recoverable when the at will
employee can demonstrate that the employer implied that
monitoring would not occur, or where the employee can
demonstrate that the employer's monitoring deprived the
employee of the benefit of bargained-for employment.
Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700,
765 P.2d 373, 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 239 (1988) (eliminating bad faith tort cause of
action). For a full analysis of the status of each state's recognition of the covenant, see
JOHN C. McCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 2D (1990 and
Supp. 1991) (illustrating six degrees to which the covenant is recognized: (1)
jurisdictions recognizing bad faith contract cause of action, (2) jurisdictions recognizing
bad faith tort cause of action, (3) jurisdictions recognizing limited "Massachusetts
Version" of employer bad faith doctrine, (4) jurisdictions requiring public policy
violation to establish employer bad faith, (5) jurisdictions declining to recognize bad
faith cause of action in at will employment, and (6) unsettled jurisdictions).
52. Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 626, 778 P.2d at 748; accord Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765
P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239; see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
147 Ariz. 370, 384, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985).
53. Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 627, 778 P.2d at 749; accord Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765
P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
54. Id.
55. Craver, supra note 2, at 62.
56. Id.
57. Misrepresentation by the employer that monitoring will not occur may also
provide the employee with a tort action for deceit; see infra part II.C.
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C. Torts--The Common Law Right to Privacy
Some uses of enhanced monitoring may provide an
employee with a tort action. Depending on the manner in
which enhanced monitoring is utilized, an employee may have
a tort action for intrusion into the employee's right to privacy,
wrongful discharge, or misrepresentation. Application of these
tort actions to the employer's use of enhanced monitoring will
be individually addressed.
1. Privacy
Although privacy issues are inherent in the intrusive
nature of enhanced monitoring, the right to privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
does not prohibit non-governmental intrusions.' Under the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional
rights to privacy, only parties engaged in state action are con-
stitutionally prohibited from invading an individual's privacy.5 9
However, a constitutional right to privacy prohibiting certain
non-governmental intrusions does exist under some state con-
stitutions, such as California and Louisiana.' Furthermore,
58. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1954); see generally 2 Tunow,
PRIVACY LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 9.02 [3][d] (1990).
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. For the United States Supreme Court
interpretations of the state action doctrine, see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (providing that threatened sale of furniture under New York statute permitting
warehouseman to sell stored property does not constitute state action and therefore
cannot violate Fourteenth Amendment); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (stating that termination of utility service by highly regulated
private electrical company was not state action under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment
creates no shield against merely private conduct); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 935 (1982) (providing that only conduct that may be fairly characterized as state
action can violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
60. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984)
(applying CAL. CONST. art. I § 1 to private employers); LA. CONST. of 1974, art. 1, § 5;
St. Julien v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 433 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
Washington State's Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. In
Southcenter Joint Venture v. NDPC, 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1982), the
Washington Supreme Court held that state action is required for free speech
protection under WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. The Washington Supreme Court stated in
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988), that art. I, § 7
provides greater protection to individual privacy interests than the Fourth
Amendment, and the Washington Court of Appeals stated in State v. Patterson, 51
Wash. App. 202, 204, 752 P.2d 945 946 (1988), that "the purpose of art. I, § 7 is to protect
an individual's right to privacy rather than to curb governmental actions."
Nevertheless, the Washington courts have not generally applied the Washington
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private employees may be protected by the common law right
to privacy that sounds in the tort of intrusion.6" Because the
courts have applied the same analysis to the invasion of
employee privacy under both the state constitutional and the
tort privacy actions, these actions will be addressed together.
The common law right to privacy protects employees from
"an intentional interference with an interest in solitude or
seclusion, either as to the person or as to the private affairs or
concerns [of the person], of a kind that would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable man."'6 2 To create an action for invasion of
privacy, the employer must intentionally intrude upon some
aspect of the employee's private life in a manner that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.3
While an employee "must face the prospect of discharge
for failing or refusing to do his work in accordance with the
employer's directions . .. there are innumerable facets of the
employee's life that have little or no relevance to the employ-
ment relationship, and over which the employer should have
no control." 64 Employee expectations of privacy in non-busi-
constitution to prohibit non-governmental intrusions. See also State v. Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d 54, 65, 720 P.2d 808, 814 (1986). In other cases, however, the Washington
Supreme Court applied the privacy protection of art. I, § 7 to permit termination of
life-support systems for terminably ill patients and to secure a sixteen year old
woman's right to an abortion. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983);
State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). Privacy protection was extended,
in those cases, because criminal sanctions, state licensing of physicians, judicial
involvement in guardianship, and the state's parens patriae responsibility for
incompetents were sufficient factors on which to base a finding of a nexus of state
action.
For a full discussion of the state action doctrine in the State of Washington, see
David M. Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A
Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 221 (1985). Professor
Skover argues that the Washington State Constitution does not compel the complete
adoption of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the state action
doctrine under the federal Constitution and concludes that because the state action
doctrine fulfills no instrumental or normative state constitutional function, reason
dictates that Washington should abandon the doctrine.
61. Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mich. 1990); PROSSER
& KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see, e.g., Nader v. General
Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 568, 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1970)
("privacy is invaded only if the information sought is of a confidential nature and the
defendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive").
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977).
64. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1421
(1967); see, e.g., Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285
(1990) (dictum).
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ness areas such as restrooms, changing rooms, and off-the-job
activities are statutorily protected in some states.' While the
employer's monitoring of the personal activities of the
employee is restricted, privacy concerns may not preclude the
employer from monitoring the business activities of the
employee.
No bright lines can be drawn between personal and busi-
ness activities." In determining whether enhanced monitoring
violates an employee's right to privacy, three factors are con-
sidered: the means used in obtaining the information, the
employer's purpose in obtaining the information, and the
nature of the information sought. 7 Like the wiretap laws,
where the employer gives notice that monitoring will occur in
a reasonably intrusive manner for a business concern, the
employee cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy."
Notice defines what the employer expects to be private and
allows the employee either to seek alternative employment or
implicitly consent to reasonable monitoring by continuing
employment, thus negating the employee's expectation of pri-
vacy.69 The California Court of Appeals recently declined to
restrict an employer's use of a pupillary reaction eye examina-
tion as a method of drug testing, stating that "the employer
can always [monitor] its employees to see if they are perform-
65. TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.02[3]. For statutes protecting employees' off-the-
job privacy, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 2001-12 (1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.62 (1),
(8) (Callaghan 1988). For a statute protecting employee's restroom and locker room
privacy, see CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48(b) (1987).
66. See Blades, supra note 64, at 1407.
67. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 61, at § 117; see Nader, 25 N.Y.
2d at 568, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 653 ("Privacy is invaded only if the
information sought is of a confidential nature and the defendant's conduct was
unreasonably intrusive .... mere gathering of information about an individual does not
give rise to a cause of action under intrusion.").
68. Baggs, 750 F. Supp. at 272; see also Saldana v. Kelsey-Haynes Co., 178 Mich.
App. 230, 233-235, 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1989) (stating that employee's privacy
expectations subject to legitimate interest of employer in investigating suspicions that
employee's work-related disability was pretextual).
69. The effect of an employer's notice that locker rooms and dressing rooms are
being monitored on the employee's expectation of privacy has yet to be addressed by
the courts. However, cases have held that retail merchants can negate a customer's
reasonable expectation of privacy in store dressing rooms by posting notice that the
rooms are under surveillance. See Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 128 Mich. App. 165,
172, 339 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1983); Gillet v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1979). By analogy,
"providing notice [to employees] that such areas as dressing rooms and locker rooms
are under surveillance serves to defeat [the employee's] expectations of privacy."
TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.03[3][d].
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ing the job properly and safely."7  The court noted that
because the employer was only observing what was visually
obvious, the means of sensory monitoring was non-intrusive."
The right to privacy provides only partial common law
protection for the white collar employee. Where non-intrusive
means of monitoring are used for the business purpose of
ensuring safety, productivity, or performance, courts will gen-
erally tolerate the employer's action.72  But, where the
employer has not notified the employee that his activities are
being monitored and the monitored activity is personal rather
than business in nature, or where the monitoring is unreasona-
bly intrusive, the employee may have a tort cause of action
under the common law right to privacy.73 Damages recover-
able under such an action may include actual harm, mental dis-
tress, and special damages.74 Special damages may also be
awarded for loss of employment if the invasion of privacy was
a substantial factor in the loss of that employment.75
2. Wrongful Discharge
"Workplace privacy litigation occurs most frequently when
employees are terminated. ' 76 Privacy issues under the public
policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will are reg-
ularly addressed as wrongful discharge. To be actionable
under the public policy exception to employment at will, a
wrongful discharge must affect a singularly public interest and
not merely a private or proprietary interest.77 The instances in
70. Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 287 (1990)
(dictum).
71. Id.
72. TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.02[3].
73. See, e.g., TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.02[3]; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 61,
at § 117.
74. TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.06[5]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652H (1977).
75. TURow, supra note 58, at § 9.06[5].
76. SHEPARD & DUSTON, supra note 21, at 91.
77. Norman v. Rec. Centers of Sun City, 156 Ariz. 425, 430, 752 P.2d 514, 519
(1988); accord Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 29, 267 Cal. Rptr.
618, 635 (1990) (stating that employee's termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis
drug testing was not a violation of public policy). The jurisdictions that recognize the
public policy exception differ in opinion about the sources from which public policy
may be defined. McCARTHY, supra note 51, at 3. Strict jurisdictions, including
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, and Wisconsin, require a statutory expression of public
policy. See, e.g., Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979). Liberal
jurisdictions, including Arizona, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Vermont, accept expressions
of public policy from other sources such as court decisions, regulations, and
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which courts have recognized a wrongful discharge cause of
action on public policy grounds fall into four categories: (1)
employees discharged for refusing to commit an unlawful act,
(2) employees discharged for performing a public obligation,
(3) employees discharged for exercising a legal right or privi-
lege, and (4) employees discharged for whistleblowing."
The first category encompasses employees discharged for
refusing to commit unlawful, wrongful, or unethical acts.79 In
Petermann v. Local 396, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters,' wrongful discharge liability was imposed on a labor
union for terminating an employee because he refused to per-
jure himself before a state legislative committee.8' Cases in
this category have allowed employees recovery in tort for dis-
charges that result from employees refusing to violate federal
or state laws and "for refusing to perform tasks that were
either unlawful or unethical." 2
In the second category are employees discharged for per-
forming a public obligation. Employees fired for performing
various public obligations, such as attending jury duty, phoning
the police, and refusing to ignore a subpoena, have stated a
cause of action under this category. 3 In Nees v. Hocks, 4 the
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor of an
employee discharged for performing jury duty on the grounds
that the jury system and jury duty are obligations of citizen-
ship.' Similarly, in Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard,"
the California Court of Appeals held that employees fired for
professional ethics codes. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d
625 (1982) (recognizing that public policy may be derived from prior judicial decisions
and administrative regulations). Washington is among the most liberal jurisdictions.
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984),
the court defined the public policy standard as broader than the standards articulated
in Parnar. See also Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash. 2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989).
78. Dicomes, 113 Wash. 2d at 618, 982 P.2d at 1007; Lopatka, supra note 39, at 7.
79. Lopatka, supra note 39, at 8.
80. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
81. Id.
82. Lopatka, supra note 39, at 8 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F.
Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417
A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
83. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (jury duty); Girgenti v. Cali-
Con, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 130, 544 A.2d 655 (1988) (phoning the police); Ludwick v. This
Minute of Cal., Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985) (refusal to ignore subpoena)).
84. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
85. Id.
86. 90 Cal. App. 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949).
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serving as election poll officials could recover compensatory
and punitive damages in tort.8 7 Finally, in Girgenti v. Cali-
Con, Inc.," the Connecticut Court of Appeals held that a movie
theater employee stated a tort claim when he was fired for
clearing the theater and calling the police to apprehend a sus-
pected intruder in the projection booth. 9
In the third category are employees discharged for exercis-
ing certain legal rights or privileges. While the most common
cases involve employees discharged for filing workers compen-
sation claims, "other examples include cases in which employ-
ees were fired for exercising their state law rights to join a
labor union, to refuse to take a polygraph test, [and] to refuse
to submit to a serious invasion of privacy."'9  The theory
underlying this particular exception, as outlined by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,91 is
that, absent protection from the threat of employer reprisal,
employees would not avail themselves of legally available com-
pensation for work related injuries and losses.2
In the fourth, and final, category are employees discharged
for blowing the whistle on employer wrongdoings. In
Palmateer v. International Harvester CO.,9 3  the Illinois
Supreme Court held that an employee discharged for providing
local law enforcement with information about a co-worker's
criminal activity stated a wrongful discharge cause of action.
94
87. Id. See also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1980) (terminating quality control director for efforts to correct false food labeling);
see Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 234, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984)
(providing that employee has a tort claim when discharged for attempting to institute
accounting procedure designed to deter bribery of foreign officials).
88. 15 Conn. App. 130, 544 A.2d 655 (1988).
89. Id. at 138, 544 A.2d at 656.
90. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (recognizing a
wrongful discharge cause of action for retaliatory firing of employee who filed a
worker's compensation claim); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d
793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (interference with right to join labor union); Hentzel v.
Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (discharging employee in
retaliation for protesting cigarette smoking as a hazardous working condition); Fulford
v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.H. 1985) (discharging employee in retaliation for
filing a personal injury action against supervisor states a cause of action for wrongful
discharge).
91. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
92. Id.
93. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
94. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 878; see also Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash. 2d 612, 620,
782 P.2d 1002, 1009 (1989); Cagle v. Burns and Roe, 106 Wash. 2d 911, 726 P.2d 434
(1986) (employee discharged after threatening to report orders to violate safety
regulations to the Nuclear Regulatory Agency); Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82,
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The court stated that "there is no public policy more basic,...
than the enforcement of a state's criminal code.""5
Wrongful discharge sounds in tort on the theory that
"although the cause of action arises in the context of contrac-
tual relationship, the source of the legal duty inheres in public
policy."' Because actionable wrongful discharge is dependent
on the employer's violation of public policy, courts have histor-
ically looked to statutory policies for support of the action.'
Where an employer utilizes monitoring in a manner that vio-
lates the wiretap laws or the privacy rights of an employee and
the information subsequently results in the discharge of that
employee, the employee may seek punitive damages under a
wrongful discharge theory." In addition to potential punitive
damages, wrongful discharge allows recovery of compensatory
damages for loss of wages, earnings, or commissions.'
3. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
Misrepresentation and nondisclosure encompass a broad
set of tort actions designed to protect a party's economic inter-
est in arriving at a business judgment without being misled.1"°
Misrepresentations fall into three general categories based
upon intentional deception (deceit), negligence, or strict liabil-
ity. Misrepresentation in the employment relationship typi-
cally involves either deceit or negligence.
An action for deceit may arise where the employer, with-
out belief in the representation, knowingly or recklessly repre-
sents to the employee, either at the time of contracting or
during the course of employment, that monitoring will not
occur and then the employer subsequently monitors the
employee.' 0 ' In Berger v. Sec. Pac. Information Sys.,"°2 the
Colorado Court of Appeals recently held that "[a]n employer's
722 P.2d 250 (1986) (refusal to allow the termination of a police officer who informed a
judge sentencing a prisoner that the prisoner had been unlawfully detained).
95. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 128, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
96. Lopatka, supra note 39, at 16.
97. See, e.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
98. Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful
Discharge of At-Will Employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 1131 (1986).
99. Lopatka, supra note 39, at 16.
100. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.1 (2d ed. 1986 and supp.
1991); PROSsER & KEETON, supra note 61, at § 105.
101. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 61, at § 107.
102. 795 P.2d 1380 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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right to terminate an at-will employee without cause does not
protect the employer from liability for fraud in inducing the
employee to accept employment.' 10 3 To recover on the basis of
deceit, the employee must show that the false representation
was knowingly or recklessly made by the employer with intent
to induce the employee to rely on the representation and that
the employee was injured by justifiably relying on the
representation. 1°4
Negligent misrepresentation occurs when a person makes
a false statement without reasonable grounds for belief in the
truth of the statement. °5 Liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation resulting in economic harm generally requires a rela-
tionship accepted in the community as carrying an obligation
on the part of one party to employ reasonable care not to mis-
lead the other party."° In Brown v. Maxfield,1"7 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
demonstrated that the at will employment relationship carries
such an obligation."x a The Brown court found that an applicant
103. Id. at 1384; see also Ramsay Health Care, Inc. v. FoRmer, 560 Ala. 746, 752, 560
So. 2d 746, 751 (1990) (financially unstable health care provider's failure to fulfill
assurances of a termination benefits package, which was equivalent to one year of
salary and was offered as inducement for an accountant to accept employment, was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of fraud in inducement).
104. PROSSER & KEETON, 6mpra note 61, at § 105; Douglas v. Superior Court
(Weiner), 215 Cal. App. 3d 155, 263 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1989); see generally Albrant v.
Sterling Furniture Co., 85 Or. App. 272, 736 P.2d 201 (1987) (where the employer
promised to hire an employee for day shifts at 8% commission and subsequently gave
the employee night shifts at less than 8% commission, the court held that the
employee had a right to rely on the representations until she knew or should have
known the terms of her employment were modified); Matthews v. Fed. Land Bank of
St. Louis, 718 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (employee proved elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation against employer by proving that employer represented to her that
existing sick leave benefits were protected during a personal leave of absence, that
employee took a leave of absence in reliance on employer's representations, and that
employee was subsequently terminated for taking sick leave).
105. Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 1087, 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 287 (1990) (citing,
5 WriN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAw, TORTS, § 676 at 778 (9th ed. 1988)); see
Holland Furnace Corp. v. Korth, 43 Wash. 2d 618, 622-23, 262 P.2d 772, 776 (1953) ("If a
person represents as true material facts susceptible of knowledge, to one who relies
and acts thereon to his injury, he cannot defeat recovery by showing that he did not
know his representations were false or that he believed them to be true.").
106. See generally 2 HARPER Er AL., supra note 100, at § 7.4 ("On the whole ...
courts have provided a remedy for negligent misrepresentation principally against
those who advise in an essentially nonadversarial capacity." In comparison, where
misrepresentations entail the forseeability of physical harm and such harm in fact
results, the ordinary rules of negligence apply.).
107. 663 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
108. Id.
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for a newscasting position established a cause of action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation by proving that he was told by the
newstation to which he had applied that he could quit his prior
job, that he quit his prior job in reliance on the newstation's
representations, and that he suffered pecuniary loss as a result
of that reliance.1°9 Stating that "a party negotiating a termina-
ble at will contract has a right to assess the risks inherent in
such employment free from the distortions of tortious con-
duct," the court held that the applicant's potential employers
had acted with "conscious indifference" to the truth of their
representations and thus were liable in tort for negligent
misrepresentation.110
Nondisclosure of material facts can also result in tort lia-
bility where the employer, who has a duty to disclose, makes
representations that would be misleading without disclosure or
tells only half the truth."' When dealing with another, a per-
son has a duty to disclose facts that "in equity or good con-
science should be disclosed. 112 Stated more precisely, in the
employment relationship an employer has a duty to disclose to
the employee facts that the employer knows will create a false
impression unless other facts are disclosed.1 13
Employees have successfully pursued nondisclosure
actions against their employers for failure to disclose pending
changes in employment policy and for failure to disclose the
pending termination of a position shortly after hiring for that
position." 4 Thus, in situations where an employer does not
disclose the use of enhanced monitoring or where an employer
represents that employee productivity will be subjectively mea-
sured, the employer's implementation of enhanced monitoring
without notice to employees may create an action for nondis-
closure if the employer knows that nondisclosure of monitor-
ing will give a false impression to the employee.
Damages for misrepresentation and nondisclosure may be
measured on either an out-of-pocket or benefit-of-the-bargain
109. Id. at 1206.
110. Brown v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp. 1193, 1203, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
111. Berger v. Sec. Pac. Info. Sys., 795 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1965)).
112. Id. at 1383.
113. 1I at 1383; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) (1965).
114. Elizaga v. Kaiser Found. Hosp. Inc., 259 Or. 542, 547, 487 P.2d 870, 873 (1970);
Andolsun v. Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., Inc., 196 A.2d 926, 927 (D.C. 1964).
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basis. 11 The out-of-pocket rule attempts to restore the claim-
ant to the position occupied before entering employment. The
benefit-of-the-bargain rule attempts to place the claimant in
the position occupied if the representations were true. In the
cases involving failure to disclose, cited above, the courts have
awarded the more favorable benefit-of-the-bargain damages."'
Only where misrepresentation reaches the level of deceit may
punitive damages be awarded." 7
D. Legal Summary
The employer's right to implement enhanced monitoring
is not without limitations. First, the employer and the
employee can bargain restrictive terms into the employment
contract. Second, wiretap laws provide partial statutory pro-
tection for the content of an employee's personal communica-
tions. Third, exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will
provide employees with contract and tort remedies when the
employer's use of enhanced monitoring is against public policy
or breaches a legally or factually implied term of the employ-
ment contract. Fourth, tort law provides the employee with a
cause of action when the employer intrudes upon the
employee's privacy, misrepresents to the employee that moni-
toring will not occur, or uses monitoring in such a manner that
results in a wrongful discharge of the employee. Given the
partial legal limitations on the employer's right to monitor, an
economic analysis of the white collar employment market in
which enhanced monitoring occurs is useful for determining
whether further legal restrictions on the employer's right to
monitor are necessary.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF ENHANCED MONITORING
Economic analysis of enhanced monitoring expands on the
issue of economic efficiency in a Capitalist economy. Employ-
ers are in business to maximize profit. For that reason, a legal
115. See, e.g., Annotation, Measure of Damages for Fraudulently Inducing
Employment Contract, 24 A.L.R.3d 1389 (1969).
116. Elizaga, 259 Or. at 547, 487 P.2d at 873; Andolsun, 196 A.2d at 927.
117. Boivin v. Jones & Vining, Inc., 578 A.2d 187, 189 (Me. 1990). "An award of
punitive damages is justified where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted with malice (citation omitted). Express or actual
malice exists when the tortious conduct is motivated by ill will toward the plaintiff."
Id. Punitive damages are also available where deliberate conduct by the employer is so
outrageous that malice can be implied.
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analysis of enhanced monitoring must account for the eco-
nomic incentives and disincentives that encourage the
employer to obey or disobey the law. Because economic con-
siderations potentially play as significant a role in an
employer's decision to monitor employees as do legal consider-
ations, legislation that does not account for the economic forces
that bear upon the employment relationship will run the risk
of being ineffective. Section III of this Comment examines
wage determination and market equilibrium within the con-
text of an internal primary labor market under the influence
of enhanced monitoring."'
A The Labor Market
A labor market strives to match the employers' need for
labor time with the employees' desire for income. A labor
market equilibrium exists when the amount of labor time
desired by the employer equals the supply of time or effort
from the employee at market wage and working conditions.
Stated another way, the labor market strives to voluntarily
match employers and employees so that both are better off by
bargaining for employment than by not bargaining for employ-
ment. However, equilibrium is not static in labor markets. 119
Instead, labor markets are subject to continual change and are
always adjusting toward equilibrium.
The average labor market model employed in this Com-
ment is based on the following assumptions: The model
assumes that employees are rational and have incentive to
maximize utility and that employers in a competitive market
have incentive to maximize profits and to operate at a zero eco-
nomic profit. Employees in the labor market are assumed to
have perfect information and to be heterogeneous in their sen-
118. See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 3, at 3. The term labor market
refers to many different markets, including the national or local, primary or
secondary, and internal or external labor markets. Primary labor markets address
white collar employment, whereas secondary labor markets are concerned with blue
collar employment. External labor markets refer to pre-employment labor markets.
Internal primary labor markets exist within the firms themselves and can be
considered post-employment markets.
119. Market equilibrium is subject to market forces on both the supply and
demand side. The five basic forces that cause a shift in supply are technological
advances in production, the expectations of the supplier, the number of the suppliers
in the market, the opportunity costs of providing the good, and the cost of resources
for producing the good. The five basic forces that cause a shift in demand are the
tastes and preferences of the consumer, expectations of the consumer, money, the
price of the good, and the price of substitute goods.
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sitivity to monitoring. Employers in the labor market are
assumed to be heterogeneous in their level of efficiency and in
their ability to implement monitoring systems. The model also
assumes that a variety of jobs exist with differing levels of
monitoring, that fixed costs of initially implementing monitor-
ing are very high, and that monitoring will always be costly to
the employer, but that the rational employer will conduct a
cost-benefit analysis. The final assumption of the average
labor market model employed in this Comment is that moni-
toring represents varying degrees of disutility to all workers.
The labor market is composed of two elements: supply
and demand. The price of labor in the market is represented
by the real wage rate, W/P.2 ° The employee represents the
element of supply. In other words, the employee is the labor.
The employer represents the element of demand. The
employer is a price taker; in other words, the employer must
pay the employee the prevailing market wage.
The employer's demand is equal to the employee's margi-
nal revenue of product.' 21 The marginal revenue of product is
equal to the change in revenue generated by a change in the
number of employees employed. Assuming diminishing margi-
nal returns, each additional employee hired will increase mar-
ginal revenue of product at an increasing rate. Eventually,
however, the hiring of each additional employee will increase
revenue at a decreasing rate.
An increase in the real wage rate will yield a subsequent
decrease in the quantity of labor demanded. Moreover, the
quantity of labor supplied will increase because the employee's
120. W is the wage rate paid out, and P is the price of the good or product.
121. See generally EHRENBERG & SMrTH, supra note 3, at 3. In the short term, the
employer's labor demand schedule is represented by the downward sloping portion of
its marginal product of labor schedule. Employers in a perfectly competitive market
have incentive to maximize profits. Profit is equal to the total revenue minus the total
cost, P = TR - TC (where P is profit, TR is total revenue, and TC is total cost).
Employers will then hire workers until marginal revenue of labor is equal to marginal
cost of labor, MRL = MCL (where MRL is the marginal revenue of labor and MCL is
the marginal cost of labor). At any point on the marginal productivity of labor
schedule where marginal revenue of labor is greater than marginal cost of labor,
MRL> MCL (points to the northwest of point M on Figure 1), the employer will
increase employment to capture more profit. Conversely, where marginal revenue of
labor is less than marginal cost of labor, MRL < MCL (points to the southeast of point
M), employers will decrease employment in order to cut costs and thus increase profit.
At point M on Figure 1, marginal revenue of labor is equivalent to marginal cost of
labor, MRL = MCL, and a move to increase or decrease employment would decrease
profits. Similarly, any movement from point M would upset economic profits, which
firms in a competitive market must maintain at zero.
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opportunity costs of choosing leisure time over work time have
increased. In plain terms, the increase in real wages will
increase the employee's willingness to work, and the employee
will trade leisure time for income. The increased wage rate
will induce more people into the market, thus increasing the
supply of labor to the point where the price of labor is bid










Based on the fact that employers in the competitive market will hire to the point
where MRL = MCL, it follows that employers will pay a real wage rate equal to the
employee's marginal product of labor. The wage rate, W, represents the marginal cost
of labor, MCL (ceterus parbuas). In a competitive market, the employer's marginal
revenue equals the price of the good, MR = P (where P is equal to the price of the
good produced and MR is the marginal revenue). The additional revenue generated is
also referred to as the marginal revenue of product (MRP). Where equation 1 is
MRP = (MPL)*(MR) (1)
or equally where equation 2 is
MRP = (MPL)*(P) (2)
profits will be maximized by a competitive firm. In other words, this is the point
where the MRL = MCL (3) or where MRP = W (4). Substituting equation number 2
into equation number 4 yields, MPL*P = W. Dividing by P yields the equation,
(MPL)=W/P. At this point the marginal product of labor is equal to the real wage
rate, and the competitive firm will stop hiring. The conclusion is one that has
remained a cornerstone of labor economics; employers in a competitive market will
pay employees a real wage equal to their marginal productivity of labor.
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Employers, however, are primarily concerned with the
employees' level of productivity in relation to the wage rate.
This relationship is important because the employer's profits
decrease as the marginal productivity of labor falls below the
real wage rate.' s Thus, the supply of labor is a function of the
wage rate.
Nevertheless, even though the supply of labor is a function
of the wage rate, employees will expect the wage rate to reflect
the bundle of characteristics of a particular job, including the
work environment. Use of enhanced monitoring to evaluate
employee productivity inherently alters the work environ-
ment. 24 As one noted labor economist states, as "those things
122. D represents original demand. S represents original supply. W/P is the
original wage rate. W/P is the (charge) increase in wage rate. Q is the equilibrium.
Qo is the decreased quantity demanded. Qs is the increased quantity supplied. S' is
the increase in supply.
The increase in supply bids down the equilibrium wage to W/P2 yielding an
increase in demand to D' and a return to the original wage W/P.
123. See supra note 121.
124. See generally JOHN HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES (1932).
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which we have to take as final data of economic enquiry-
changes in tastes, changes in knowledge, and changes in the...
environment . . . change, so the marginal product of labor
changes with them.'1 25 Intuitively, as enhanced monitoring
alters the work environment, it will affect employee productiv-
ity.126 Three main questions must then be addressed. First,
under what circumstances does enhanced monitoring increase
employee productivity? Second, will enhanced monitoring be
more effective if concealed? Finally, can equilibrium exist in
the white collar employment relationship when the use of
enhanced monitoring is concealed? These questions are
addressed in Part IV of this Comment. However, an under-
standing of the answers is predicated upon the legal issues
already discussed and a review of Adam Smith's Theory of
Compensating Wage Differentials and the Hedonic Theory of
Wages.
The Theory of Compensating Wage Differentials states
that jobs with unattractive or disagreeable work environments
or recurring tasks will command higher wages than jobs free
from these characteristics.'2 7 The increase in wages is the com-
pensating wage differential,us which should equal the margi-
nal disutility experienced from working in a particular job."2
Therefore, "the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of
the different employments of labor and stock must, in the
same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or continually
tending toward equality," and compensating wage differentials
will exist up to the point where the marginal cost of providing
the differential equals the marginal benefit."3
The Hedonic Theory of Wages is predicated upon the con-
cept of compensating wage differentials. 3' This theory dissects
jobs into their unique characteristics and groups these charac-
teristics according to the utility or disutility employees are
expected to derive from the job. Each characteristic is then
125. HICKS, supra note 124, at 18. John Hicks is a noted economist and the
originator of the ISLM Model, a model that combines the real and monetary sectors of
the economy. See, WILLIAM S. BROWN, MACROECONOMICS 74, 106 (1988).
126. HicKS, supra note 124, at 18.
127. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 100 (1937).
128. Id.
129. Utility is the pleasure, satisfaction, or need fulfillment that people get from
their economic activity. Disutility is the opposite: the displeasure, dissatisfaction, or
lack of fulfillment that people get from their economic activity.
130. SMITH, supra note 127, at 100.
131. See generally EHRENBERG & SMrrH, supra note 3, at 207-16.
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priced in terms of wages. Utility increasing characteristics
such as flex-time or a quiet work environment are purchased
by the employee in the form of lower wages. Characteristics
which exhibit disutility to the employee are, in a sense, sold to
the employee in the form of higher wages. The model is com-
prised of the employer (demand side) iso-profit curves and the









Figure 3 represents various wage/monitoring combinations
that yield equal amounts of utility for the employee. At point
A, the level of monitoring is compensated by wage A. As mon-
itoring increases to point B, compensation increases to wage B.
The upward slope of the utility curve represents the average
labor market model assumption that monitoring is a bad job
characteristic, and as such, yields disutility to the employee.
The degree of slope, however, represents the assumption that
the steeper the degree of slope, the greater the employee's
aversion to monitoring and the larger the wage differential
required to offset an increase in monitoring.
1991]







In Figure 4, the employer is represented through iso-profit
curves. The iso-profit curves in Figure 4 illustrate various
combinations of monitoring and wages that yield the same
amount of profit. At point A, the firm pays wage A, but as
monitoring increases to point B, the firm pays wage B. The
firm is able to pay this wage differential because the increase
in monitoring leads to an increase in productivity, and subse-
quently, revenue. The wage differential is equal to the margi-
nal revenue gained through monitoring. Thus, all points on
the curve represent equal amounts of profit for the firm.
The shape and slope of the iso-profit curves convey impor-
tant information. The concave shape of the iso-profit curves
represents the diminishing marginal returns to the firm after
monitoring is increased beyond the optimal point. However,
firms are heterogeneous in their ability to implement monitor-
ing systems in an efficient manner. This ability is represented
in the slope of the curves. The flatter the slope the less effi-
cient the firm is at monitoring. The more efficient firm will
derive a greater net benefit from monitoring and the wage dif-
ferential they are able to pay will be higher, as illustrated in
Figure 5.
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Having examined the basic elements of the market within
the context of the Hedonic Theory of Wages, a full market
graph can now be constructed. Figure 5 represents the iso-
profit curves of two employers A and B and the utility curves
of two employees X and Y. Employee X, having a low aversion
to monitoring, is more efficiently matched with employer A.
Employer A is less efficient at monitoring and will thus pay a
smaller wage differential to employees. Based on the curve of
employee X, this employee requires less compensation for
working in a monitored environment. Employee Y maximizes
utility by working for employer B. Employee Y requires
greater compensation for working in a monitored environment.
Employer B is more efficient at monitoring and is thus able to
pay a higher wage differential. By paying a higher wage,
employer B operates at zero economic profit. Thus, employees
with a high aversion to monitoring maximize their utility with
employers who are more efficient in implementing monitoring
systems. Employees with a lower aversion to being monitored
are more efficiently matched with employers who are less effi-
cient at implementing monitoring systems.
The Hedonic Wage Theory model presented above
assumes that monitoring is disclosed by the employer. Assum-
ing disclosure, the market leads to efficient allocation of
1991]
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employees among employers. However, employers who moni-
tor may choose to conceal the monitoring. Concealment leads
to costly implications for both the employer and the employee.
IV. EFFECT OF ENHANCED MONITORING UPON WHITE
CoLLAR EMPLOYMENT
Monitoring increases the employers' ability to measure
objectively employee productivity, to pace work, and to reduce
employer losses from employee theft and fraud. 32 Although
implementation of enhanced monitoring will initially be costly,
the employer will have incentive to monitor where the net
benefits of measuring the value of an employee outweighs the
costs of implementation.
At the same time, employees will derive disutility from
enhanced monitoring and will therefore have incentive to
determine whether or not the employer is monitoring. As
already noted, the effect of enhanced monitoring on the
employment relationship is contingent upon the manner in
which the employer implements the monitoring and the aver-
sion of the individual employee to being monitored. Employ-
ees who derive disutility from monitoring will either seek
wage compensation for this disutility or seek alternative
employment. Therefore, an employer opting to implement
enhanced monitoring faces two options: (1) disclose the use of
enhanced monitoring to the employees or (2) conceal the use
of enhanced monitoring and surreptitiously monitor the
employees. This section of the Comment will discuss the rela-
tive merits of these options.
A Disclosure
The first of the employer's options is to disclose the use of
monitoring to employees. An employer's decision to inform
employees that enhanced monitoring techniques are being used
will result in certain costs and benefits.
Along with the start-up costs of implementing enhanced
monitoring, the employer may incur costs in the form of
higher wages. Employees aware of the employer's use of
enhanced monitoring will have perfect information that moni-
toring is occurring and the prevailing market wage will com-
pensate employees for any disutility incurred. Thus, although
132. Craver, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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the wage the employer pays will be higher than the wage paid
if monitoring is not disclosed, employees will be able to make a
utility-maximizing choice of employment.
Disclosure of enhanced monitoring produces the additional
benefit of avoidance by both parties of the costs of mismatched
employment. The employer avoids the costs of hiring an
employee with a strong aversion to monitoring, and the
employee with a high aversion to monitoring will be able to
make a utility-maximizing choice not to seek employment with
that employer. Both avoid the potential cost of that employee
seeking alternative employment when monitoring is disclosed.
Furthermore, the highly productive employee with a low aver-
sion to monitoring may derive utility from monitored work
environments in the form of promotion and wage increases
resulting from a greater opportunity to demonstrate objective
performance.133
Finally, all parties avoid the high transaction costs of liti-
gation that may occur when the employer's use of enhanced
monitoring is disclosed. The employer's disclosure of monitor-
ing to employees prior to implementation of monitoring or
employment provides the employee with notice and the oppor-
tunity to seek alternative employment. Such notice defines
monitoring as a new term of the employment contract and lim-
its the employee's expectations of privacy. As a result, disclo-
sure may eliminate litigation arising under the wiretap laws,
the exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will, the tort
of intrusion, and the torts of misrepresentation or non-disclo-
sure. Elimination of such litigation avoids inherently high
transaction costs.
B. Concealment
The employer's second option is to conceal monitoring.
The ability to conceal monitoring is inherent in many forms of
enhanced monitoring.'3 Video cameras can be hidden from
view, electronic measuring devices can be surreptitiously
programmed into computers, phones can be tapped, and rooms
can be bugged.
133. [9A Individual Employment Rights Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 509:706
(1987) ("Monitoring is most successful when a bonus is given for working above a
certain level.").
134. Peter A. Susser, Electronic Monitoring in the Private Sector: How Closely
Should Employers Supervise Their Workers?, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 575, 577-79
(1988).
1991]
162 University of Puget Sound Law Review
If the employer conceals monitoring, then a situation of
asymmetric information results in which the employee cannot
verify the employer's observation of the employee's productiv-
ity.135 Ideally, employee and employer information about
employee output must be symmetric so that both parties can
bargain for a utility maximizing, mutually beneficial employ-
ment relationship."3
For the employer, however, concealment provides two
tempting short run benefits. First, the employer will avoid the
cost of higher wages because employees unaware of monitoring
will have asymmetric information and no incentive to bargain
for increased wages to compensate for the disutility of monitor-
ing. Second, the employer can measure productivity and pace
work without having to account for deceitful employee actions
designed to mislead monitoring systems. Employees aware
that they are being monitored have found ways to counter
monitoring. A late 1980's study by the Bureau of National
Affairs reported that
[w]hen keystrokes are monitored one key can be held down
continuously to make the count go up. Telephone operators
who are monitored can often tell if a call is going to be diffi-
cult; they'disconnect it or give bad information so they can
terminate the call in the time necessary to meet statistical
norms. [And] where video monitoring is done, employees
have shown their displeasure by spray-painting the lenses of
video cameras. 137
Consequently, concealment is advantageous to the employer
because employees cannot demand higher wages for their disu-
tility, and they cannot defeat the monitoring system if they are
unaware that the system exists.
In most cases, however, employers can not maintain sur-
reptitious monitoring indefinitely and concealment will even-
tually be revealed. The employer will ordinarily record the
data gathered through monitoring. In at least twelve states,
"records-access" laws exist that provide employees with a right
to review personnel records maintained by their employers. 3
135. JAMEs M. MALCOMSON, WORK INCENTIVES, HIERARCHY, AND INTERNAL
LABOR MARKETS (1984) appearing in EDWARD P. LAZAAR & ROBERT L. MOORE,
EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 157 (1984).
136. MALCOMSON, supra note 135, at 159.
137. [9A Individual Employment Rights Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 509:707
(1987).
138. Susser, supra note 134, at 583 n. 19; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 432, 118.5 (1989);
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Furthermore, the exceptions to the doctrine of employment at
will contribute to disclosure by limiting the employer's right to
discharge. Where the exceptions apply, the employees may
force the employer to articulate the grounds for discharge and
thereby force the employer to reveal data surreptitiously col-
lected through monitoring. Even where the exceptions do not
apply, dismissed employees will seek to determine the grounds
for their dismissal. Likewise, when employees with similar
characteristics gain raises and promotions, speculation will rise
among the employee pool about the data used to measure
employee performance. Eventually, information that monitor-
ing is occurring will be discovered and disclosed throughout
the workforce.
When concealed monitoring is disclosed, the employer
faces costs that may be substantially greater than the costs the
employer would incur if monitoring was disclosed at the out-
set. One of these costs may be litigation expense. For the
courts, the propriety of monitoring appears to depend on the
nature of the monitoring, the employee's awareness of the
monitoring, the classification of the monitored activity as busi-
ness or private, and the egregiousness of the monitoring." 9 As
described above in Part II, the relatively recent exceptions to
the doctrine of employment at will and the recent strengthen-
ing of the right to privacy widen the avenues of legal relief
available to employees.
Under the statutory protection of wiretap laws, the moni-
toring of an employee's personal calls without notice is illegal.
Under contract law, the employer's use of enhanced monitor-
ing in a manner that violates an express or implied term of the
employment contract may result in liability for breach of con-
tract. Similarly, under the tort of intrusion, where the
employer fails to notify the employee that his or her activities
are being monitored and the monitored activity is personal
rather than business in nature or the monitoring is unreasona-
bly intrusive, the employee may have a common law right to
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-128a to 31-128h (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 719 to
724 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (West 1990); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 423.501-
.512 (Callaghan 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.075 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 275:56 (1987); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1321-24 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.12.240-.260 (1990); WIS. STAT. § 103.13 (1988).
139. See generally Watkins v. L.M. Berry Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
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privacy action.14° Under the tort of wrongful discharge, an
employee can recover punitive damages when monitoring is
used in a manner that violates the wiretap laws or the privacy
rights of the employee and subsequently results in the
employee's discharge.141 Finally, in the situation where an
employer chooses not to disclose that employee productivity
will be surreptitiously measured, the employer's implementa-
tion of enhanced monitoring without notice to employees may
provide a tort action for nondisclosure.
Recent studies illustrate the enormous costs that employee
legal actions impose on an employer. According to one study,
workplace privacy actions brought by employees against their
employers between 1985-1987 resulted in a nationwide average
jury verdict of $316,000.1' Similarly, two mid-1980's California
studies of wrongful discharge jury trials reported, respectively,
"a ninety and a ninety-five percent plaintiff success rate and a
$450,000 average and $548,000 median damage award.' 1 43 Given
these figures, damages alone could be sufficient to put a small
employer out of business.
Additionally, the employer will incur turnover costs as
employees with high aversion to monitoring seek alternative
employment. Turnover costs will include loss of the experi-
ence and training invested in current employees, the cost
incurred while training replacement employees, and the poten-
tial loss of reputation in the market for future employees.
Loss of a solid reputation within the market may bring
about the most damaging costs. 144 "[Ain equilibrium in which
neither [the employer or employee] defaults may exist even
when it pays to default in the short term.... The cost to [the
employer] of losing a reputation for honesty, and hence not
being trusted not to default in the future, may exceed the
140. See, e.g., TuRow, supra note 58, at § 9.02[3]; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
61, at § 117.
141. Dougherty, supra note 98, at 1131.
142. SHEPARD & DUSTON, supra note 21, at 1-2 (the survey embraced all workplace
privacy jury verdicts including allegations of employer liability for defamation, breach
of confidentiality, disclosure of private facts, and wrongful discharge).
143. Lopatka, supra note 39, at 3 (citing, Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination
Litigation: "Dogwood and Goliath," ABA Sec. on Lab. and Employment Law
Manuscript at 1-2 (1983) (referring to a study by San Francisco law firm of Orrick,
Herring, and Sutcliffe); Joann S. Lublin, Firing Line: Legal Challenges Force Firms to
Revamp Ways They Dismiss Workers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1983, at 15-16 (referring
to a study by Frederick Brown, a San Francisco management lawyer)).
144. Blades, supra note 64, at 1421.
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short-term gain from defaulting." '145 This threat of unfair
treatment has a "significant negative economic impact because
[it] foster[s] dissatisfaction and disloyalty."'" Once current
and potential employees learn of employers' surreptitious use
of enhanced monitoring, employers will have to implement
greater wage differentials to lure and maintain loyal employ-
ees. Furthermore, some employees, "offended by what they
see as a sudden lack of trust, [will] reduce their efforts to only
what is necessary. '"147
In the long term, incentives exist for the employer to dis-
close information to the employee. The short term benefit of
surreptitious monitoring is limited and will result in substan-
tial long term costs to the employer. "The continuity and
expertise supplied by a stable workforce, the benefits from loy-
alty, and the savings from reduced training costs and lower
turnover all contribute to the long-run success of an enter-
prise."'14 Although disclosure of enhanced monitoring may
result in less effective monitoring, the long term loss of trust
and reputation, coupled with turnover costs and possible legal
transaction costs, will offset the short term gains of
concealment.
The apparent short term benefits of concealed monitoring
provide employers with strong incentives not to disclose. Disu-
tility incurred from monitoring, however, provides employees
with incentive to discover the employer's concealed use of
enhanced monitoring. If the employer discloses, then employ-
ees will have perfect information that monitoring is a term of
employment, and the parties will mutually bargain for a utility
maximizing relationship. Even if the employer conceals, the
employees have incentive to maximize their utility by forcing
disclosure. Thus, over time the market will force disclosure.
The critical difference between concealment and early dis-
closure is that the costs of concealment will be incurred before
eventual disclosure. Early disclosure avoids the additional
costs of concealment. Therefore, legislation should be enacted
requiring employers to disclose the use of enhanced monitor-
ing to employees. Mandatory disclosure would provide an
145. MALCOMSON, supra note 135, at 159.
146. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1835.
147. [9A Individual Employment Rights Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 509:707
(1987).
148. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1835.
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effective mechanism for the avoidance of the costs of
concealment.
V. PROPOSED NOTICE LEGISLATION
During the 101st Congress, comprehensive disclosure legis-
lation was introduced in both the United States House of Rep-
resentatives and the United States Senate as The Privacy for
Workers and Consumers Act. 149 During the 102nd Congress,
the legislation was reintroduced in the United States Senate.
150
The goal of the legislation is to "prevent potential abuses of
electronic monitoring in the workplace.' 151 If adopted, the leg-
islation would require employers to provide written notifica-
tion to employees that the employees' activities are being
electronically monitored. 52
The legislation would specifically require employers to dis-
close the type of information being collected, the frequency
with which the information is collected, the purpose for which
the information is collected, and the effect the information will
have on performance standards.1 53 Employers would, however,
be allowed to collect information relevant to the employees'
work performance." 4  Although the employer would be
allowed to collect relevant information, the legislation would
protect the employee's privacy by prohibiting the employer
from disclosing the information collected to anyone except the
149. The House proposal, sponsored by Representatives William Clay (Mo.-D),
Don Edwards (Ca.-D), Pat Williams (Mt.-D), and Benjamin Gilman (N.Y.-R), was
referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor but never passed out of
committee. See S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 22, 1990) The Senate proposal,
sponsored by Senator Paul Simon (Ill.-D), was referred to the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources but never passed out of committee. See H.R. 2168, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (May 2, 1989).
150. See S. 516, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter S. 516]. The
Senate proposal, again sponsored by Senator Paul Simon (Ill-D), was referred to the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and remained there as of the
Committee's Aug. 5,1991 recess.
151. Id. at § 2 (1). The legislation defines "electronic monitoring" as:
[Tihe collection, storage, analysis, and reporting of information concerning an
employee's activities by means of a computer, electronic observation and
supervision, remote telephone surveillance, telephone call accounting, or
other form of visual, auditory, or computer-based surveillance conducted by
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic, or photo-optical system.
152. Id. at § 3(a).
153. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 82; S. 516, supra note 150.
154. S. 516, supra note 150, at § 5(a).
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employee. Employers would, however, be allowed to disclose if
the employee consents or the information collected is relevant
to the employee's work performance and disclosure is made to
officers and employees of the employer who need to know, to
law enforcement, or pursuant to court order.
155
Information collected could not be used as the "exclusive
basis for individual employee performance evaluation or disci-
plinary action, unless the employee is provided with an oppor-
tunity to review the personal data within a reasonable time
after such data is obtained."'" The proposed legislation would
provide similar protection to prospective employees and third
parties. Job applicants would have to be notified of the
employer's existing forms of monitoring at "any personal inter-
view or meeting," and third parties interacting with employees
would have to be notified by periodic visual or aural signals
that electronic monitoring is taking place.157 As a whole, the
legislation would force employers to fully disclose to employ-
ees and third parties interacting with employees that enhanced
monitoring is in use. By forcing disclosure, the legislation
would eliminate the costs of concealment.
However, the proposed legislation goes beyond merely
forcing disclosure. The proposal prohibits an employer from
using personal data as the sole basis for setting production quo-
tas or work performance expectations. Employers have never
been prohibited from setting production quotas or work per-
formance expectations solely on the basis of the means by
which their data is collected. The desired goal of disclosure is
to eliminate the costs of concealment by allowing the employer
and the employee to form a utility-maximizing relationship
with full knowledge about whether or not the employer is
utilizing enhanced monitoring. To prohibit the use of such
data simply because it is collected through electronic instead of
conventional means infringes upon the employer's ability to
objectively determine the value of an individual employee.
Such infringement unnecessarily decreases the value of moni-
toring to the employer.
The proposal's requirement that the information collected
through electronic monitoring be relevant to the employee's
155. Id. at § § 5(a) and (b).
156. I& at § 6(a).
157. Id. at § § 3(b)(1), (3).
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work performance raises similar concerns.1' The stated pur-
pose of the relevancy requirement is not necessary to the goal
of forcing employers to disclose the use of monitoring and may,
in fact, generate additional costs. Ongoing electronic monitor-
ing of employees will inevitably result in the collection of data
irrelevant to the employee's work performance. A require-
ment that the employer fine tune monitoring to exclude the
collection of data irrelevant to work performance will increase
the cost of monitoring by increasing the technological require-
ments for monitoring equipment. Employee privacy can be as
effectively protected without increasing the costs of monitoring
by limiting disclosure of the data collected. The tort of intru-
sion and the disclosure limitations of the proposed legislation
provide that protection..
5 9
As one noted economist has indicated, the value of pro-
posed intervention is determined by weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposal.16° In the advantages col-
umn, the legislation will overcome the employer's incentive to
conceal the use of monitoring by forcing disclosure. As a result
of disclosure, the employer and the employee will have perfect
information that monitoring is a term of the employment con-
tract, and the market will provide a wage rate at which they
will form a utility-maximizing relationship. Employees will
balance their aversion to monitoring against their wage com-
pensation, and the stability of the workforce will increase.
Information costs will be reduced, the expectations of the par-
ties will be defined with greater certainty, and the employer
will be allowed to utilize monitoring within the parameters of
the proposed legislation and existing law. The risk of turnover
costs and legal transaction costs will be diminished, and the
employer's risk of loss of reputation will be eliminated.
Finally, the employee's expectations of privacy will be
protected.
In the disadvantages column, the employer will lose the
advantages of concealment. The employer will have to pay
higher wages to compensate the employee for the disutility of
monitoring, and employees will find ways to counter the moni-
toring. Disclosed monitoring is thus likely to be less effective
than concealed monitoring. However, as discussed above, the
158. Id. at § 5(a).
159. Id. at § 5; see supra part 1.C.1.
160. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 32 (1962).
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costs associated with disclosure are clearly outweighed by costs
likely to result from concealment.
Another disadvantage is that government intervention
itself creates costs. These will include the costs of enactment,
administration, and dissemination. The primary cost of inter-
vention will be enforcement. Under the proposal, enforcement
will be delegated to the Department of Labor. 6' Delegation to
the Department of Labor advantageously reduces enforcement
costs because the notice regulations can be enforced under
Department procedures already in place for the enforcement
of wage and hour regulations. Furthermore, the proposal pro-
vides for both civil penalties enforced by the Department and
civil actions brought privately by employees.16 2 Private civil
action under the legislation provides a plaintiff with legal and
equitable relief "including employment, reinstatement, promo-
tion .... the payment of lost wages and benefits.., and attor-
ney's fees."'16 3 Providing for private civil action ensures that
employees have an incentive to expose employer monitoring
on their own. Such a provision partially shifts the cost of
enforcement to those employees who incur the greatest disutil-
ity from the employer's use of enhanced monitoring.
Enforcement costs can be further reduced by tailoring the
legislation to balance the interests of both the employer and
the employee. These interests are best balanced by encourag-
ing the employer to disclose the use of enhanced monitoring
without restricting either party's ability to gather information.
As proposed, the legislation sharply restricts the employer's
ability to utilize enhanced monitoring. In order to alleviate
those restrictions, the requirements that the information gath-
ered be relevant to the employee's work performance and that
the employer not use personal data as the sole basis for setting
production quotas or work performance expectations should be
eliminated. The proposed legislation should simply encourage
disclosure of the use of enhanced monitoring and allow the
informed parties and the market to determine what effect
monitoring will have on the white collar relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
As technology advances, employers will increasingly have
161. S. 516, supra note 150, at § 7(a)(2).
162. Id. at § 7.
163. Id. at § 7(3)(c).
1991]
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the opportunity to implement enhanced monitoring of white
collar employees. Despite the fact that the market will eventu-
ally force disclosure of an employer's use of enhanced monitor-
ing, unrecognized costs are associated with concealment. The
economic and legal effects of enhanced monitoring of white
collar employees indicate that the enactment of narrowly tai-
lored legislation requiring the employer to disclose the use of
enhanced monitoring will reduce those costs. With modifica-
tion, enactment of the federal Privacy for Workers and Con-
sumers Act can reduce those costs by effectively encouraging
employers to disclose the use of enhanced monitoring to their
employees.
